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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , : Case No, 860169 
- v - : 
WENDALL H. HOFFMAN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appel lant . : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1 . Did t h e t r i a l cou r t p rope r ly proceed on t h e charge 
a g a i n s t defendant? 
2 . Did t h e t r i a l cou r t c o r r e c t l y i n s t r u c t t h e ju ry 
under UTAH CODE ANN. S 58-12-28(4) (1986)? 
3 . Does defendant have s tanding t o cha l l enge § 58-12-
28(4) as being u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y overbroad? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Wendall H. Hoffman, was charged with 
p r a c t i c i n g medicine wi thout a l i c e n s e , a t h i r d degree f e lony , 
under UTAH CODE ANN. S 58-12-30 (1986) (R. 1 , 3 9 ) . 
After a j u r y t r i a l , defendant was found q u i l t y as 
charged (R. 4 1 ) . The cour t sentenced defendant t o a term of zero 
t o f i v e y e a r s i n the Utah S t a t e p r i s o n , but s tayed t h a t sentence 
and p l aced him on c o n d i t i o n a l p roba t ion for a per iod of not l e s s 
than e igh teen months (R. 41-42) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 1 3 , 1985, P h y l l i s Franco, an i n v e s t i g a t o r for 
the Consumer P r o t e c t i o n Agency of the Department of Business 
Regulations, telephoned defendant 's place of business . Energy 
Evaluation and Research in Ogden, using a f a l se i d e n t i t y , for the 
purpose of inves t iga t ing a complaint a l leging defendant 's 
unauthorized prac t ice of medicine. Defendant did not hold and 
had not applied for a l icense to prac t ice any branch of medicine 
in Utah. Ms. Franco complied with in s t ruc t ions she received 
during the telephone conversation by mailing $60.00 to defendant 
along with a l e t t e r in which she fa l se ly claimed to be suffering 
from severe stomach pains . She also claimed in the l e t t e r tha t 
defendant had t rea ted one of her acquaintances (R. 50-56). 
About two weeks l a t e r , Ms. Franco received a l e t t e r 
from defendant e n t i t l e d "Energy Analysis Report." The l e t t e r 
contained a document which s ta ted t h a t she had energy v ibra t ions 
which exhibited 10,000 negative energy, 14,000 arsenic in her 
stomach, and a 290 white blood ce l l count also in her stomach. 
During the two week period between Ms. Franco's telephone ca l l t o 
defendant 's office and the receipt of his l e t t e r , Ms. Franco had 
no contact with defendant (R. 53-54, 67-68). 
On August 1 , 1986, Ms. Franco, who was in perfect 
hea l th , made an appointment t o meet with defendant a t Energy 
Evaluation and Research. Upon enter ing the office with another 
i nves t iga to r , Ms. Franco spoke with a r ecep t ion i s t about the 
meaning of the "Energy Analysis Report ." The recep t ion i s t 
offered to refund the $60.00 payment if Ms. Franco was not 
s a t i s f i e d ; however, Ms. Franco repl ied t h a t she merely wanted t o 
understand the meaning of the a n a l y s i s . While wai t ing, Ms. 
Franco observed several other rooms in the establishment, one of 
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which appeared t o have p i l l s and other medication on the she lves . 
Defendant appeared and escorted the two inves t i ga tors 
i n t o another room. After Ms. Franco said that her stomach s t i l l 
hurt , defendant poked at her stomach and put h i s hand on her 
knee. Indicating that h i s energy project ions should have made 
her f e e l b e t t e r , he asked Ms. Franco t o wri te her name on a piece 
of paper. Defendant then took a "bobbin type of thing" which was 
attached t o a s t r ing and swung i t back and forth over the paper. 
Soon therea f ter , he informed Ms. Franco that she had three ulcers 
in her stomach which were caused by food addi t ives such as 
n i t r i t e s and n i t r a t e s . He suggested that the best cure for 
stomach u lcers was t o rinse one f s food in "Celes t ia l Water" which 
defendant sold for $30.00 a ga l lon . "Celest ial Water," according 
to defendant, was normal water energized by the s tar s through a 
device he had designed. As an a l t e r n a t i v e , defendant suggested 
that Ms. Franco wash her food in clorox before eat ing i t . 
Subsequently, defendant obtained two b o t t l e s of p i l l s 
from a back room, gave them to Ms. Franco, and t o l d her t o take 
them four times a day. The b o t t l e s a l l e g e d l y contained pain 
k i l l e r s and medication for u lcers which defendant claimed had 
helped h i s daughter who had been s imi lar ly i l l . Prior to the 
i n v e s t i g a t o r s 1 departure from h i s o f f i c e , defendant a l so 
mentioned that he had several types of s p e c i a l l y designed p i l lows 
for various d i s e a s e s , including one for u l c e r s . The meeting with 
defendant l a s t e d approximately f o r t y - f i v e minutes (R. 5 5 - 6 3 ) . 
About one month l a t e r , Ms. Franco again telephoned 
defendant and complained that she was not f e e l i n g b e t t e r . 
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Defendant expressed astonishment that she was not wel l and 
subsequently mailed another b o t t l e of ninety capsules to Ms. 
Franco which cost her $25.00. The capsules a l l e g e d l y contained 
peach bark (R. 64 -66 ) . 
SVMMAPY QF AftSVMENT 
Because defendant f a i l e d t o object in the t r i a l court 
t o the a l l eged noncompliance with UTAH CODE ANN. S 58-12-29.5 
(Supp. 1985) (amended 1986) and there i s nothing in the record t o 
support defendant's claim that S 58-12-29.5 was not complied 
with# the Court should not address defendant's assignment of 
error in t h i s regard. 
By f a i l i n g t o object at t r i a l to the in s t ruc t ion he 
chal lenges on appeal, defendant i s precluded from review in t h i s 
Court of the a l l eged ins truc t iona l error. Moreover, even i f the 
Court were t o address the i s s u e ra i sed , the t r i a l court correc t ly 
read UTAH CODE ANN. S 58-12-28(4) (1986) , which def ines "practice 
of medicine," in the d i s j u n c t i v e . 
Defendant f a i l s t o meet the standing requirements for 
h i s overbreadth chal lenge . Therefore, the Court should dec l ine 
to address h i s argument. 
Defendant's po l icy objec t ions t o the Medical Pract ice 
Act are not properly d irected t o t h i s Court; they should be 




DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE CRIMINAL 
ACTION AGAINST HIM UNDER THE UTAH MEDICAL 
PRACTICE ACT. 
Defendant argues that he i s e n t i t l e d t o a reversal of 
h i s convict ion because the criminal ac t ion f i l e d against him was 
not preceded by approval of that act ion by the Physicians 
Licensing Board under UTAH CODE ANN. S 58-12-29.5 (Supp. 1985) 
(amended 1986) .* However, because defendant f a i l e d to object to 
the criminal information in the t r i a l court based on an a l leged 
noncompliance with S 58-12-29.5 and there i s nothing in the 
record to support d e f e n d a n t s claim that the board's approval was 
not obtained, t h i s Court should decl ine to address h i s assignment 
of error . See State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 308-09 (Utah 
1
 The 1985 version of S 58-12-29.5 provided: 
The representat ive committee for persons who 
apply for , or have been granted a l i c e n s e to 
pract ice medicine and surgery in a l l branches 
under the Utah Medical Practice Act sha l l be 
a committee of s i x physicians l i censed under 
that act and one lay member, to be known as the 
"Physicians Licensing Board." Notwithstanding 
Chapter 1 , T i t l e 58, the concurrence of at l e a s t 
f i v e members of the board i s required for the 
taking of any act ion under the Utah Medical 
Pract ice Act. 
The current version provides: 
The representat ive committee for persons who 
apply for or have been granted a l i c e n s e to 
pract ice medicine and surgery in a l l branches 
under the Utah Medical Practice Act sha l l be 
a committee of s i x physicians l i c ensed under 
the act and one lay member, to be known as 
the "Physicians Licensing Board." 
1985); S t a t e v . La i rbv , 699 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Utah 1984); S t a t e v . 
Wul f f ens t e in , 657 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982) , c e r t , den i ed . 460 
U.S. 1044 (1983) . 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY OBJECTION TO THE INSTRU-
CTION ON "PRACTICE OF MEDICINE;" ALTERNATI-
VELY, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY READ THE 
PROVISIONS OF SECTION 58-12-28(4) DISJUN-
CTIVELY. 
Defendant a rgues t h a t t h e t r i a l cour t e r roneous ly 
i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y on the s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n of " p r a c t i c e of 
med ic ine . " That i n s t r u c t i o n ( I n s t r u c t i o n No. 7; R. 25) only 
i n c o r p o r a t e d the d e f i n i t i o n provided in § 58-12-28(4) (a) .2 
Defendant contends t h a t t h e cou r t was o b l i g a t e d t o i n s t r u c t on 
a l l the d e f i n i t i o n s of " p r a c t i c e of medic ine" con ta ined in § 58-
2
 Sec t i on 58-12-28(4) p r o v i d e s : 
(4) " P r a c t i c e of medicine" means: 
(a) t o d iagnose , t r e a t , c o r r e c t , a d v i s e , or 
p r e s c r i b e for any human d i s e a s e r a i lmen t , 
i n j u r y r i n f i r m i t y , deformi ty , pain or o the r 
c o n d i t i o n , phys i ca l or men ta l , r e a l or 
imaginary, or t o a t tempt t o do so by any 
means or i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y ; 
(b) t o ma in ta in an o f f i c e or p lace of 
b u s i n e s s for t h e purpose of doing any of 
t h e a c t s desc r ibed in Subsect ion (a) whether 
or not for compensation; 
(c) t o u s e , i n the conduct of any occupa-
t i o n or p r o f e s s i o n p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e d i a g n o s i s 
or t r ea tmen t of human d i s e a s e s or c o n d i t i o n s 
in any p r i n t e d m a t e r i a l , s t a t i o n e r y , l e t t e r -
head, enve lopes , s i g n s , a d v e r t i s e m e n t s , t h e 
d e s i g n a t i o n " d o c t o r , " "doctor of med ic ine , " 
" p h y s i c i a n , " " su rgeon ," "phys ic ian and 
s u r g e o n , " " D r . , " "M.D." or any combination 
of these d e s i g n a t i o n s , un l e s s the d e s i g -
n a t i o n a d d i t i o n a l l y c o n t a i n s t h e d e s c r i p t i o n 
of the branch of t h e h e a l i n g a r t s for which 
t h e person has a l i c e n s e . 
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12-28(4) because those three d e f i n i t i o n s are to be read 
conjunct ively rather than d i s j u n c t i v e l y . 
F i r s t , defendant did not object at t r i a l to the 
ins t ruc t ion he chal lenges on appeal. Therefore, the Court should 
not address the issue he r a i s e s . State v. Nor en, 704 P.2d 568, 
571 (Utah 1985); Utah R. Crim. P. 1 9 ( c ) . 
Second, even i f the Court were to reach the quest ion, 
the t r i a l court correct ly read subsect ions (4) (a) , (b) and (c) 
d i s j u n c t i v e l y rather than conjunct ive ly . Although those 
subsect ions are se t out in the s t a t u t e without any connecting 
words, they are most l o g i c a l l y read as three d i s t i n c t d e f i n i t i o n s 
of "practice of medicine." This seems obvious given the use of 
semicolons t o separate the subsect ions . A s imilar construction 
has been given UTAH CODE ANN. SS 58-37-8(1) (a) ( i ) through ( iv) 
(1986) , criminal provis ions in the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act . See , e . g . , S ta te v. Hansen. 710 P.2d 182 (Utah 1985) 
(evidence s u f f i c i e n t for convict ion under § 58-37-8(1) ( a ) ( i i ) ) ; 
S ta te v. Ontiveros . 674 P.2d 103 (Utah 1983) (defendant should 
have been charged under S 5 8 - 3 7 - 8 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i v ) rather than § 58-37-
8(1) ( a ) ( i i ) ) ; S ta te v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709 (Utah 1980) 
(evidence s u f f i c i e n t to support convict ion under § 58-37-
8(1) ( a ) ( i ) ) . Furthermore, the h is tory of the "practice of 
medicine" provis ion r e f l e c t s a c lear l e g i s l a t i v e intent to 
provide several d i s t i n c t and separate d e f i n i t i o n s . See State 
Board of Medical Examiners v . T e r r i l l , 48 Utah 647, 161 P. 451 
(1916) (construing 1911 Utah Laws ch. 93—a s t a t u t e f a c i a l l y 
s imi lar to current subsect ions (4) (a) and ( c ) ) . Cf. UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 58-7-1 .1 (5) (1986) (defining the "practice of 
dentistry") . 3 F ina l ly , courts in other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have read 
s i m i l a r l y worded s t a t u t e s in the d i s j u n c t i v e . E.g. State v . 
IffiUlf 4 Ariz . App. 541 , 544, 422 P.2d 172, 175 (1966); State v . 
Moore, 141 Mt. 86, 8 9 - 9 1 , 375 P.2d 218, 219-21 (1962) . 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT LACKS STANDING TO CHALLENGE SECTION 
58-12-28(4) ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS UNCON-
STITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD. 
Although the heading of Point I I I in d e f e n d a n t s brief 
i n d i c a t e s that he chal lenges S 58-12-28(4) as being both 
uncons t i tu t iona l ly overbroad and vague, Br. of App. at 7 , the 
argument contained in that point r e l a t e s only t o the overbreadth 
i s s u e . Therefore, the State w i l l l i m i t i t s response to the 
3
 Sect ion 5 8 - 7 - 1 . 1 ( 5 ; provides: 
"Practice of dent i s try" means: 
(a) t o o f f e r , undertake, or indicate in 
any way that a person or h i s agent w i l l 
undertake by any means or method, to 
diagnose, t r e a t , operate , or prescribe for 
any d i s e a s e , pain, injury, de f i c i ency , 
deformity, or physical condit ion of the 
human t e e t h , a lveolar process , gums, 
jaws, or adjacent s tructures in the maxil-
l o f a c i a l region, or to take impressions 
or r e g i s t r a t i o n s to supply a r t i f i c i a l 
t ee th as s u b s t i t u t e s for natural t e e t h , 
or t o take impressions of the tee th or 
jaws, or to remove s t a i n s or concret ions 
from t e e t h , or to correct or attempt to 
correct malpos i t ions of teeth? 
(b) ind icate or advert i se by t i t l e , 
degree, or in any other way, that one i s 
a d e n t i s t ; or 
(c) t o act as a proprietor or operator 
of a place where dental operat ions are 
performed. 
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quest ion of overbreadth. And, because i t i s clear that defendant 
lacks standing t o make such a chal lenge , the quest ion of whether 
defendant should have brought h i s claim in a preconvict ion act ion 
for injunct ive or declaratory r e l i e f w i l l not be addressed. See 
State v . Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1983) , appeal 
d ismissed, 464 U.S. 910. 
To be overbroad, a s ta tu te must reach "a substant ia l 
amount of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected conduct!;] [ i l f i t does not , 
then the overbreadth challenge must f a i l . " State v . Murphv, 674 
P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1983) (quoting Vi l lage of Hoffman Estates 
v . F l i p s i d e , Hotfman Es ta te s , I n c . , 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982) ) . 
F i r s t , defendant f a i l s t o ident i fy any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y protected 
conduct that a regulatory s t a t u t e l i k e that at i ssue could not 
permissibly cover. Second, much of the a c t i v i t y he claims the 
s t a t u t e impermissibly reaches i s exempted from regulation under § 
58-12-30(5) .4 See State v. Yee Foo Lun, 45 Utah 531, 539, 147 P. 
Sect ion 58-12-30(5) provides: 
I t i s unlawful to engage in the pract ice of 
medicine in t h i s s t a t e without f i r s t obtaining 
a l i c e n s e . Any person who engages in the prac-
t i c e of medicine without a l i c e n s e sha l l be 
g u i l t y of a fe lony; except the fol lowing persons 
may engage in a c t i v i t i e s included in the prac-
t i c e of medicine subject t o the circumstances 
and l i m i t a t i o n s s t a t e d : 
(5) any individual administering a domestic 
or family remedy including those persons 
engaged in the sa l e of vitamins, health food 
or heal th food supplements, herb or other 
products of nature, except drugs or medicines 
for which an authorized prescr ipt ion i s 
required by law! . ] 
- 9 -
488# 491 (1915) (defining domestic medic ines ) . Third, defendant 
f a i l s to demonstrate that he has standing t o r a i s e an overbreadth 
chal lenge, in that he appears t o re ly only on the s t a t u t e ' s 
a l leged overbreadth as t o o thers . The fo l lowing language from 
ptate v . Jordan i s par t i cu lar ly apropos: 
The rule s t i l l stands that where defendants 
were not charged with an a c t i v i t y , the 
adjudicat ion of that a c t i v i t y , though encom-
passed under the sanct ions of the s t a t u t e , 
must await a real controversy. 
* * * 
Here, the a l leged overbroad language in the 
s ta tu te can be narrowly construed, given the 
context in which i t appears, and we do not 
think that t h i s case lends i t s e l f to an 
adjudicat ion of hypothetical claims not 
before us . 
665 P.2d at 1284 ( c i t a t i o n omi t ted) . And, because defendant does 
not show that the a l l eged ly overbroad language has a "ch i l l ing 
e f f e c t " upon c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r i v i l e g e d ac t ion , the exception t o 
the general standing requirement i s not app l i cab le . As noted by 
the Colorado Supreme Court in a case dealing with a s imilar 
chal lenge t o that s t a t e ' s pract ice of medicine s t a t u t e : 
Here, the s ta tu te under attack i s a criminal 
s ta tu te that dea ls e x c l u s i v e l y with harmful, 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y unprotected conduct, and has 
no d i s cern ib l e e f f e c t on speech or expres-
s ion . Pursuant t o i t s po l i ce power, Coloreido 
may def ine and regulate the pract ice of 
medicine and may prohibi t unlicensed i n d i v i -
duals from providing medical treatment. 
See , e . g . , Dixon v . Zick, 179 Colo. 278, 
500 P.2d 130 (1972); Lipset v. Davis , 
119 Colo. 335, 203 P.2d 730 (1949) . The 
pract ice of medicine i t s e l f i s not pro-
t e c t e d by the f i r s t amendment. Therefore, 
reasonable regulat ion of medical prac t i ce 
does not c o n f l i c t with f i r s t amendment 
p r o t e c t i o n s . See , e . g . , Garcia v. Texas 
fftate Board of Medical Examiners, 384 F.Supp. 
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434 (W.D. Texas 1974) , a f f ' d . 421 U.S. 955, 
95 S.Ct. 2391, 44 L.Ed.2d 663 (1975). 
The unlawful pract ice of medicine s ta tu te 
thus has a broad, l eg i t imate scope. In 
contrast , we have not been able to discern 
any s p e c i f i c overbroad app l i ca t ions , sub-
s t a n t i a l or otherwise, that t h i s s ta tu te 
may have. Under these circumstances, we 
refuse to consider the hypothetical 
c h i l l i n g e f f e c t t h i s s t a t u t e may have in 
unknown future cases . See People v. Stage# 
195 Colo. 110, 575 P.2d 423 (1978) (over-
breadth challenge not considered where 
no showing of threat t o f i r s t amendment 
r i g h t s ) • 
People v . J e f f e r s . 690 P.2d 194, 198 (Colo. 1984) . 
F ina l ly , d e f e n d a n t s c i t a t i o n t o Andrews v. Bal lard , 
498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980) , merits but a short response. 
That case , which held that a Texas law l i m i t i n g the pract ice of 
acupuncture to l i censed physic ians operated t o deny p a t i e n t s 
the ir right of privacy, does not deal with an overbreadth claim 
l i k e that presented here. Therefore, i t has l i t t l e relevance to 
the i s sue t h i s Court must r e s o l v e . 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S POLICY OBJECTIONS TO THE MEDICAL 
PRACTICE ACT ARE NOT PROPERLY DIRECTED TO 
THIS COURT. 
Although the heading t o Point IV in defendant's brief 
i n d i c a t e s that he r a i s e s a challenge t o the Medical Pract ice Act 
under the f i r s t and fourteenth amendments t o the United S ta te s 
Const i tut ion , Br. of App. at 13 , he provides no l e g a l a n a l y s i s of 
that i s s u e . Therefore, the Court should decl ine to reach the 
i s s u e . S ta te v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since 
the defendant f a i l s t o support [her] argument by any legal 
a n a l y s i s or authori ty , we dec l ine t o rule on i t . " ) . 
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Furthermore, d e f e n d a n t s argument in Point IV i s l i t t l e 
more than an attack on the pol icy underlying the Act, which 
should be directed t o the l e g i s l a t u r e and not to t h i s Court. 
Review of the wisdom, as opposed t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y , of 
part icular l e g i s l a t i o n simply i s not a function of t h i s Court. 
£fi£ S ta te v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1985); Stone v. 
Department of Reg i s t ra t ion , 567 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Utah 1977) . 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, d e f e n d a n t s 
convict ion should be affirmed. * 
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